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PRECAP; Bassett v. Lamantia: Deciding the Scope or Viability of 




Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, November 29, 2017, at 9:30 
a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek 




This case bears on an ongoing debate regarding the 
constitutionality of Montana’s public duty doctrine. Plaintiff Robert 
Bassett (Bassett) sued Defendants Billings City Police Officer Paul 
Lamantia (Lamantia) and City of Billings (City) after Lamantia mistook 
Bassett for a fleeing suspect, tackled him to the ground, and tore his rotator 
cuff.1 Defendants have asserted that they are shielded from liability by the 
public duty doctrine.2 In response, Bassett has asked this Court to create 
an exception to the doctrine when government defendants are the direct 
and sole cause of a plaintiff’s injury.3   
Predicated on the proposition that “a duty owed to all is a duty 
owed to none,”4 the public duty doctrine immunizes government actors 
from liability to individual plaintiffs when, barring any other special 
relationship between the parties, the duty the government owes is a duty 
to the public at large and not to individual members of the public.5 When 
applied, the doctrine prevents individual plaintiffs from establishing a 
prima facie negligence claim by negating the legal duty element; absent 
any legal duty, a negligence claim necessarily fails.6 Application of the 
                                                 
1 Order Certifying Question to the Montana Supreme Court at 3–4, Bassett v. Lamantia, 
https://perma.cc/N4G4-FXLD (https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-
0322%20Order-Certifying%20Question%20--%20Rulings%20-
%20Other%20Courts?id=%7B2058605C-0000-CD1F-98A0-1562855BD401%7D) (9th Cir. 
May 30, 2017) (D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00091-SEH). 
2 Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee Paul Lamantia, Basset v. Lamantia, https://perma.cc/4ZJ5-
NDR8 (https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0322%20Appellee's%20Response%20--
%20Brief?id=%7B70C90F5E-0000-C812-8E65-E1D329CDE577%7D) (Mont. Aug 23, 2017) (OP 
17-03222); Defendant-Appellee City of Billings’ Answer Brief, https://perma.cc/PE89-FNBD 
(https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0322%20Appellee's%20Response%20--
%20Brief?id=%7BA037115E-0000-CD1D-98A1-1523FA38EB5C%7D) (Mont. Aug. 23, 
2017) (OP 17-0322). 
3 Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief, Bassett v. Lamantia, https://perma.cc/3SWP-3MWN 
(https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0322%20Certified%20Question%20-
%20Opening%20--%20Brief?id=%7B8050515D-0000-CB3D-B00F-02E7514EDFCD%7D) (Mont. 
Jul. 17, 2017) (OP 17-0322). 
4 Nelson v. Driscoll, 983 P.2d 972, 977 (Mont. 1999). 
5 Massee v. Thompson, 90 P.2d 394, 403 (Mont. 2004). 
6 Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 5. 
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public duty doctrine has therefore functioned to deny plaintiffs redress for 
harm suffered as a result of government negligence.7  
Opponents of the public duty doctrine, retired justices Nelson and 
Cotter chief among them, submit that it directly violates Article II, section 
18, of the Montana Constitution,8 which provides that: 
The state, counties, cities, towns, and all other local 
governmental entities shall have no immunity from suit 
for injury to a person or property, except as may be 
specifically provided by law by a 2/3 vote of each house 
of the legislature.9 
The delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention 
deliberately eliminated sovereign immunity, which they found repugnant 
to the fundamental premise of American justice.10 The delegates sought to 
ensure fair and just redress, regardless of whether the injuring party was a 
private citizen or a governmental agency.11 Opponents contend that the 
Court’s adoption and application of the public duty doctrine has revived 
governmental tort immunity in direct contravention of Article II, section 
18, infringing both the constitutional right of persons to sue a 
governmental entity for injury to person or property, and the province of 
the Legislature.12 
Despite this continuing debate regarding the viability of the public 
duty doctrine, including vocal opposition from recently retired justices of 
this Court, Bassett declines to challenge its constitutionality in his briefs. 
Instead, he asks the Court to recognize a new exception to the doctrine.13 
As a result, the public duty doctrine stands to survive challenges by amici 
in light of judicial custom to address and decide only those issues raised 
by the parties.14 Ultimately, therefore, the immediate fate of the public 




                                                 
7 Massee, 90 P.3d at 407 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
8 Amicus Curiae Brief of the Montana Trial Lawyers Association at 6-8, Bassett v. Lamantia, 
https://perma.cc/9UFM-K7Y5 (https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-
0322%20Amicus%20--%20Brief?id={00A3515D-0000-CF2B-8743-530DAD328E31}) (Mont. Jul. 
17, 2017) (OP 17-0322); e.g. Massee, 90 P.3d 394 (Nelson, J., dissenting); Gonzales v. City of 
Bozeman, 217 P.3d 487 (Mont. Aug. 2009) (Leaphart, J., concurring and dissenting) (Cotter, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
9 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 18. 
10 Massee, 90 P.3d at 408–09 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 412. 
13 Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 7; Plaintiff-Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6, 
Bassett v. Lamantia, https://perma.cc/23HH-YFNV 
(https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0322%20Certified%20Question%20-
%20Reply%20--%20Brief?id=%7BE050595E-0000-C816-8199-CB07CA9F3AC2%7D) (Sept. 6, 
2017) (OP 17-0322). 
14 Gonzales, 217 P.3d at 495–96 (Leaphart, J., concurring and dissenting) (Cotter, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
While responding to a call about a neighborhood disturbance, 
Lamantia began on-foot pursuit of an unidentified male suspect.15 The 
chase took Lamantia through Bassett’s backyard, and after hearing some 
commotion, Bassett emerged from his house to investigate.16 Uncertain as 
to Bassett’s identity and unable to see well in the dark, Lamantia tackled 
Bassett to the ground.17 As a result, Bassett sustained a torn rotator cuff.18 
The fleeing suspect was never apprehended.19 
Bassett filed suit against Lamantia and the City in state district 
court. He alleged a state law claim of negligence against Lamantia for 
failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties, as well 
as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute that allows a civil 
action against the government for deprivation of civil rights.20 Defendants 
removed the case to federal district court, and the judge granted their 
motions for summary judgment on both claims.21 Concerning the 
negligence claim, the court held that Defendants were shielded from 
liability by the public duty doctrine.22 
Bassett appealed the dismissal of the negligence claim to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.23 Finding no controlling precedent of this Court 
regarding the issue raised on appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified the 
following question for resolution: whether, under Montana law, the public 
duty doctrine shields a law enforcement officer from liability for 
negligence where the officer is the direct and sole cause of the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff.24 
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Plaintiff-Appellant Bassett 
 
Bassett urges the Court to narrow the scope of the public duty 
doctrine by carving out an exception to the rule for instances in which an 
officer is the direct and sole cause of harm to the plaintiff.25 As the Court 
has articulated it, the public duty doctrine expresses the policy that a police 
officer’s duty to protect and preserve the peace is owed to the public at 
                                                 
15 Order Certifying Question to the Montana Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 4. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2017). 
21 Order Certifying Question to the Montana Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 4. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 5. 
24 Id. at 7.  
25 Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 4. 
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large and not to individual members of the public.26 Yet, Bassett argues, 
Montana courts have never applied the public duty doctrine where a law 
enforcement officer is the sole cause of the plaintiff’s injury; rather, the 
doctrine shields law enforcement from liability for failing to protect the 
plaintiff from harm caused by a third party or outside source.27  
Bassett points to other jurisdictions that have reached this same 
conclusion and have explicitly held that the public duty doctrine does not 
apply where officers are the sole cause of a plaintiff’s harm.28 For example, 
Bassett cites Moses v. Young,29 in which a police officer accidentally 
struck and killed a motorcyclist by negligently merging into his lane while 
in pursuit of another speeding driver.30 In that case, the Court of Appeals 
of North Carolina held that the public duty doctrine cannot be used to 
shield a defendant from acts directly causing injury or death.31 Bassett 
urges the Court to recognize a similar exception to the public duty doctrine 
and to use traditional negligence principles in deciding this case. 32  
Crucially, Bassett does not challenge the constitutionality of the 
public duty doctrine. Indeed, he explicitly avoids such a challenge in his 
reply brief:  
Bassett does not argue that governments should be liable 
when they fail to protect a member of the public from 
harm resulting from a third party, or from some outside 
force. Bassett’s only request is that when an innocent 
bystander, who was standing in his own yard, is 
negligently injured by a police officer after direct physical 
contact, that the government and the officer accept 
responsibility for that injury.33 
Instead of asking the Court to abolish the public duty doctrine, 




1. Defendant-Appellee Lamantia 
 
Lamantia first disputes the characterization—proffered by both 
Bassett and the Ninth Circuit—of Lamantia as the sole cause of Bassett’s 
                                                 
26 Nelson, 983 P.2d at 977. 
27 Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 6–8 (citing Nelson, 983 P.2d 972; 
Latray v. City of Havre, 999 P.2d 1010 (Mont. 2000); Prindel v. Ravalli Cty., 133 P.3d 165 
(Mont. 2006); Gonzales v. City of Bozeman, 217 P.3d 487 (Mont. 2009)). 
28 Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 6–8 (citing Moses v. Young, 561 
S.E.2d 332, 334 (N.C. 2002); Liser v. Smith, 254 F.Supp.2d 89, 102 (D.D.C. 2003); Jones v. 
State, 38 A.3d 333, 347 (Md. 2012)).  
29 561 S.E.2d 332 (N.C. 2002).  
30 Id. at 333. 
31 Id. at 334. 
32 Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 10-11. 
33 Plaintiff-Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 13, at 6. 
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harm. At the very least, he argues, the unknown male suspect and Bassett 
himself were comparatively at fault.34  
The thrust of Lamantia’s argument presumes that the public duty 
doctrine is sound and that his conduct falls squarely within its ambit. 
Specifically, Lamantia cites the Court’s holding that where the 
government’s conduct constitutes a uniquely governmental activity, it is 
shielded from liability by the public duty doctrine.35 He then argues that 
he was performing a quintessentially unique governmental activity when 
he encountered Bassett—investigating a potential crime—and is therefore 
protected by the public duty doctrine.36 To bolster his argument, Lamantia 
further contends that, notwithstanding recent decisions limiting the 
doctrine’s sweep, the Court has reaffirmed its application to circumstances 
involving law enforcement.37  
Next, Lamantia refutes the claim that the public duty doctrine only 
applies where a plaintiff’s harm is caused by a third party, rather than a 
government actor.38 Whether the doctrine applies hinges not on the 
distinction between direct and third-party harm, but on that between a duty 
to an individual and a duty to the public at large.39  
Lamantia also challenges Bassett’s reliance upon precedent from 
other jurisdictions.40  Finally, he points out that the constitutionality of the 
public duty doctrine was not raised by the parties, and is therefore not at 
issue.41 
 
2. Defendant-Appellee City of Billings 
 
The City reiterates many of Lamantia’s arguments. It further 
argues that, contrary to Bassett’s assertions, the Court has applied the 
public duty doctrine where the government is the direct and sole cause of 
the plaintiff’s injuries.42 To support its proposition, the City cites to Eklund 
v. Trost43 and Eves v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County.44 In Eklund, an 
incarcerated youth escaped a detention center and stole his uncle’s 
vehicle.45 During the ensuing high-speed police chase, the youth drove the 
stolen car into the plaintiff, causing severe injuries.46 In Eves, a young man 
committed himself to the Montana State Hospital, but then left the hospital 
                                                 
34 Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee Paul Lamantia, supra note 2, at 6–7.  
35 Id. at 10–11. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 9. 
38 Id. at 13. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 16–17. 
41 Id. at 25–26. 
42 Defendant-Appellee City of Billings’ Answer Brief, supra note 2, at 4. 
43 151 P.3d 870 (Mont. 2006). 
44 114 P. 3d 1037 (Mont. 2005). 
45 Eklund, 151 P.3d at 875. 
46 Id. 
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grounds without telling anyone and wandered into the countryside.47 
Despite being alerted to the disappearance, neither police nor hospital staff 
initiated a search, and the young man subsequently died from exposure.48 
The City suggests that the government defendants were the direct and sole 
causes of the plaintiffs’ injuries in both Eklund and Eves.49 Therefore, the 
Court’s consideration of the public duty doctrine in those cases justifies its 
application in the case at bar.50 
The City also urges the Court to refrain from further narrowing 
the scope of the public duty doctrine, as Bassett has asked it to do.51 The 
Court already recognizes an exception to the public duty doctrine where a 
special relationship exists between a governmental defendant and 
individual plaintiff.52 A special relationship may arise in one of four 
circumstances: (1) by a statute intended to protect a specific class of 
persons of which the plaintiff is a member from a particular type of harm; 
(2) when a government agent undertakes specific action to protect a person 
or property; (3) by governmental actions that reasonably induce 
detrimental reliance by a member of the public; (4) under certain 
circumstances, when an agency has actual custody of the plaintiff or a third 
person who causes harm to the plaintiff.53 The City contends that Bassett 
never attempts to argue the existence of a special relationship in the instant 
case, and furthermore, that none applies.54  
In the same vein as its co-defendant, the City asks the Court to 
confine its analysis to the certified question, and refrain from addressing 
the constitutionality of the public duty doctrine.55 
 
C. Amici Curiae 
 
While Bassett declines to challenge the viability of the public duty 
doctrine, amici flesh out this issue in detail in their briefs.  
 
1. Appellant’s Amicus Montana Trial Lawyers Association 
(MTLA) 
 
MTLA attacks the public duty doctrine as unconstitutional. 
Because it provides governmental immunity, it defies Article II, section 
18, of the Montana Constitution, which abrogated sovereign immunity.56 
MTLA further challenges the two policy rationales traditionally advanced 
                                                 
47 Eves, 114 P.3d at 1038. 
48 Id. 
49 Defendant-Appellee City of Billings’ Answer Brief, supra note 2, at 4. 
50 Id. at 4–5, 11. 
51 Id. at 3, 6. 
52 Id. at 6. 
53 Id.; Nelson, 983 P.2d at 978 
54 Defendant-Appellee City of Billings’ Answer Brief, supra note 2, at 6–7, 11. 
55 Id. at 20–21. 
56 Amicus Curiae Brief of the Montana Trial Lawyers Association, supra note 8, at 6–8. 
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in support of public duty doctrine: first, that it insulates against excessive 
lawsuits and the immense attendant financial burden; second, that the 
doctrine ensures the government can perform its duties without 
interference.57 MTLA counters that the financial burden can be addressed 
through insurance, and is further mitigated by existing statutory limitations 
on government tort liability.58 MTLA also argues that traditional tort 
principles provide sufficient tools for assessing a government’s legal duty 
and should therefore be used to decide this case.59  
 
2. Defendants’ Amici MCAA, MSPOA, MPPA, and MACOP  
 
Amici MCAA, MSPOA, MPPA, and MACOP, respond that 
MTLA seeks relief not sought by the parties.60 Should the Court address 
the viability of the public duty doctrine, it would break with its own 
practice by exceeding the scope of the certified question.61 
 
3. Defendants’ Amici Montana League of Cities and Towns, 
International Municipal Lawyers association, and Montana 
Association of Counties 
 
Amici Montana League of Cities and Towns, International 
Municipal Lawyers Association, and Montana Association of Counties, 
articulate the purposes of the public duty doctrine and the potential 
ramifications of further limiting or destroying it.62 They raise the argument 
that the public duty doctrine is a vital part of Montana law which allows 
governmental entities to more effectively provide critical services to their 
residents.63 Moreover, amici contend, the public duty doctrine serves as a 
necessary bulwark against potentially unlimited liability; without it, 
Montana municipalities would be mired in constant litigation, and 
negligence lawsuits would consume the government’s finite resources.64 
Finally, amici argue, any statutory limitations on liability are grossly 
inadequate to curtail the financial detriment.65 
                                                 
57 Id. at 8. 
58 Id. at 8–9. 
59 Id. at 9. 
60 Brief of Amici MCAA, MSPOA, MPPA, and MACOP at 9–10, Bassett v. Lamantia, 
https://perma.cc/BL9A-GGR4 (https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-
0322%20Amicus%20--%20Brief?id=%7BA00B165E-0000-C11C-A14B-94F360AC09C8%7D) 
(Mont. Aug. 24, 2017) (OP 17-0322). 
61 Id. at 10. 
62 Brief of Amici the Montana League of Cities and Towns, International Municipal Lawyers 
Association, and Montana Association of Counties, Bassett v. Lamantia, https://perma.cc/LJ9D-
BTBX (https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0322%20Amicus%20--
%20Brief?id=%7B00BB1A5E-0000-C41D-B914-54B2728BF87D%7D) (Mont. Aug. 25, 2017) (OP 
17-0322). 
63 Id. at 13. 
64 Id. at 16. 
65 Id.  





A. Limiting the Public Duty Doctrine 
 
Defendants correctly contend that the current exception to the 
public duty doctrine does not obtain under these facts. None of the four 
special relationships exists here, and Bassett makes no attempt to dispute 
this analysis.66 Bassett does, however, make a strong case for a new 
exception. He accurately points out that Montana courts have never 
applied the public duty doctrine where a law enforcement officer is the 
sole cause of the plaintiff’s injury, but rather exclusively to shield law 
enforcement from liability for failing to protect the plaintiff from a third 
party or outside source.67  
Defendants dispute this contention but strain the facts of the two 
cases they cite, Eklund and Eves, to fit their argument. In Eklund, unlike 
in the instant case, the plaintiff was injured by a third party, and not the 
government defendant.68 In Eves, the plaintiff died from exposure to the 
elements, an outside source, after choosing to leave the hospital without 
informing any staff.69 Therefore, while the government defendants were 
negligent in monitoring the plaintiff and in failing to search for him when 
he was reported missing, they were not the direct cause of Eves’ injury. 
Furthermore, their conduct is better characterized as inaction, which is 
distinguishable from Defendant Lamantia’s conduct in the case at bar. As 
a result, the City’s argument that this Court has applied the public duty 
doctrine to shield a government defendant from liability where it is the 
sole cause of harm to the plaintiff does not find support in Montana’s 
public duty doctrine jurisprudence.  
Out-of-state decisions cited by Bassett can guide the Court in 
carving out the exception he requests. For instance, the facts of Moses v. 
Young are analogous to the facts in this case and, there, the North Carolina 
court determined that the public duty doctrine cannot immunize police 
officers who directly cause the plaintiff’s injury.70  It is worth noting that 
North Carolina’s state constitution is silent on the issue of governmental 
tort immunity.71 Arguably, then, the holding of the Moses Court carries 
even more force in Montana, where the state constitution expressly 
abolishes sovereign immunity. 
 
                                                 
66 Defendant-Appellee City of Billings’ Answer Brief, supra note 2, at 6–7, 11. 
67 See e.g. Nelson, 983 P.2d 972; Massee, 90 P.3d 394; Eklund, 151 P.3d 870; Gonzales, 217 
P.3d 487.  
68 Eklund, 151 P.3d at 873. 
69 Eves, 114 P.3d at 1038. 
70 Moses, 561 S.E.2d 332. 
71  See generally N.C. CONST. 
138 MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol. 78 
 138 
Moreover, there are broader policy reasons not mentioned in the 
briefs to support the requested exception to the public duty doctrine. As 
Lamantia points out, this action arises out of a fairly innocent case of 
mistaken identity, and caused relatively minor damages to the plaintiff.72 
But as we are painfully aware today, many encounters between law 
enforcement and citizens do not end so innocently.  
Ultimately, given the Court’s record on public duty doctrine cases, 
it seems doubtful that it will carve out Bassett’s exception. True, the Court 
has previously limited the scope of the public duty doctrine, holding that 
it should not be applied simply because the defendant is a governmental 
entity.73 However, the Court has consistently applied the doctrine where 
the defendant is a law enforcement officer. Here, not only is Lamantia a 
police officer, but he was also in the midst of pursuing a fleeing suspect, 
presumably to preserve and protect the peace, when he mistakenly tackled 
and injured Bassett. Shielding law enforcement officers from liability for 
conduct during the performance of their duties is precisely the kind of 
activity the doctrine—as fashioned over time by the Court—aims to 
protect. In these ways, the instant case seems an unlikely contender for the 
reform Bassett seeks.  
In deciding the question presented, the Court might bear in mind 
the following statement made by MTLA in its amicus brief: “[t]his Court 
has previously held that ‘a law enforcement officer has no duty to protect 
a particular person absent a special relationship because the officer’s duty 
to protect and preserve the peace is owed to the public at large and not to 
individual members of the public.’ This Court has never, however, held 
that a law enforcement officer has no duty to refrain from negligently 
harming a person.”74 
 
B. Abrogating the Public Duty Doctrine 
 
As a general rule, the Court considers briefs of amici curiae only 
insofar as they coincide with issues raised by the parties to the action.75 
Although the Court rarely departs from this rule, it will consider issues 
raised by amici when, for example, the impact is widespread, functions as 
the centerpiece of the problem, or is potentially dispositive.76  
The Court could overturn the public duty doctrine based on the 
arguments proffered by the Montana Trial Lawyers Association. Article 
II, section 18, of the Montana Constitution, provides that, absent 
legislative enactment, government defendants are liable for their negligent 
                                                 
72 Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee Paul Lamantia, supra note 2, at 2. 
73 Gatlin-Johnson v. City of Miles City, 291 P.3d 1129, 1134 (2012). 
74 Amicus Curiae Brief of the Montana Trial Lawyers Association, supra note 8, at 4. 
75 Reichert v. State, 278 P.3d 455, 463-65 (Mont. 2012). 
76 Id. 
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acts.77 This provision aims to ensure plaintiffs have legal recourse for 
injuries caused by government defendants.78 The public duty doctrine is 
incompatible with Montana’s Constitution. Although Bassett has not 
raised this challenge himself, as Defendants and their amici correctly 
indicate, the Court could make one of its rare exceptions and abolish the 




Opponents of the public duty doctrine, including at least two 
retired justices, have laid the groundwork for parties to mount a 
constitutional challenge to it. Because the plaintiff in this case has declined 
to make such a challenge, the Court will have to decide whether to carve 
out an exception to the doctrine instead, namely, that it does not apply 
when the government is the direct and sole cause of a plaintiff’s harm. 
Given the Court’s prior public duty doctrine decisions, it seems likely that 
the Court will answer the certified question affirmatively.  
 
 
                                                 
77 Lee C. Baxter, Note, Gonzales v. City of Bozeman: The Public Duty Doctrine’s 
Unconstitutional Treatment of Government Defendants in Tort Claims , 72 Mont. L. Rev. 299, 
Summer 2011, at 309. 
78 Id. 
